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JAPAN’S PARADOXICAL RESPONSE TO THE NEW 
‘GLOBAL STANDARD’ IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 




At the end of the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, Japan appeared to 
be on the verge of a defining conflict between two competing conceptions 
of corporate governance. On one side was ‘traditional’ Japanese corporate 
governance, characterised by features such as the power of internally 
promoted management to run large, listed companies with minimal 
external supervision, concern with the company as a continuing 
community, and a lack of direct attention to shareholder interests.  On the 
other side was the view that in order to restore the national economy to 
good health, Japanese business needed to adhere to an emerging global 
consensus in corporate governance (Ahmadjian, 2003, p.222).  Impetus 
was given to this view by the long series of corporate scandals that 
emerged during the 1990s and beyond, which undermined public 
confidence in corporate management as a whole. Key elements in the 
Japanese conception of the ‘global standard’ – which were largely derived 
from American practice notwithstanding their adoption by the OECD and 
a number of transnational organisations and shareholder lobbying groups – 
included an increased role for independent directors, a greater emphasis on 
the monitoring role of boards, and the empowerment of shareholders; by 
implication, power for shareholders would open the way to the 
establishment of a market for corporate control, though this may not have 
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been apparent to all.  Many of these ideas were expressed in the Corporate 
Governance Forum of Japan’s Interim Report on Corporate Governance 
Principles, issued in October 1997 (JCGF, 1997).  The tension between the 
‘traditional’ and the ‘new’ appeared to crystallise further when the 
‘company with committees’ system was introduced as a new optional 
corporate governance regime through an amendment to the Commercial 
Code in 2002, implemented in April 2003. The Japanese media described 
the new system as ‘American’ even though no such precise system existed 
in the USA (Nikkei, 2003), and were quick to observe a contrast between 
‘innovative’ companies where the new system was adopted and 
‘traditional’ ones where it was rejected or ignored.  In this way the 
Japanese debate over governance soon had the appearance of being framed 
around two polar extremes (Ahmadjian, 2003, p.216). 
In practice it is often unclear exactly what is meant by ‘traditional’ 
Japanese corporate governance, while the ‘global’ consensus represented 
by the OECD principles of corporate governance masks considerable 
differences in the law and practices of countries. However, it is not 
difficult to see how the Japanese system found itself in conflict with what 
seemed to be the new global norm. What is generally called ‘traditional’ 
Japanese corporate governance has its roots in the ‘corporate hegemony’ 
that evolved in Japan after the Second World War, whereby management 
and labour each implicitly deferred their own immediate advantage for the 
benefit of the firm, seeing it as the common source of their continuing 
prosperity (Gordon, 1998, p.201). This created the ‘community firm’ as 
the standard organisational form of the large, publicly-held corporation, 
wherein a network of shared interests pulled the whole organisation 
together at all levels (Inagami and Whittaker, 2005, pp.15-16). 
Employment, at least among full-time staff, was generally stable, and an 
unbroken line of promotions could lead a loyal and able employee to the 
very highest board positions. In social and organisational terms, the firm 
was internally focused, and the kind of self-seeking behaviour that agency 
theory identifies was normally moderated by internal social pressures 
rather than by a structure of contractual incentives or external monitoring 
devices (Dore, 2005, p.441). At the end of the 20th century, the position of 
shareholders still partially reflected their virtual disenfranchisement during 
the early 1940s under Japan’s wartime economic reforms (Okazaki, 1996, 
p.373); they were not generally regarded as the residual owners of the firm 
in the sense which became commonly accepted in America in the 1980s 
2007] JAPAN’S PARADOXICAL RESPONSE 3 
 
 
(Jacoby, 2005, p.91). The result of these interlocking factors was to create 
an internally focused style of governance that was self-regulating, hostile 
to outside interference, and rooted in the belief that corporate planning, 
management and execution formed an integrated process that could 
neither be fragmented nor entrusted to outsiders.  
 
A company president whom we interviewed in 2006 summarised this 
outlook as follows:  
 
‘I always say that there are broadly speaking three sets of stakeholders in 
our company: one is the shareholders, another is the customers, and the 
third is the employees, including the management. I think the most 
important element of managing the company is to keep these three - this 
triangle - in balance. In order to maintain that stability and proceed with 
both growth and stability in balance with one another, a company, for 
example, that just pays attention to its shareholders and continually applies 
its profits to those shareholders will end up withering away at some stage 
in the future’.  
 
The ‘global standard’ that tends to be contrasted with this view is elusive 
but the OECD’s 1999 guidelines point to a degree of international 
consensus on best practice, which persists in its 2004 revised guidelines.1 
Among the responsibilities of the board it is stated that: ‘the board should 
be able to exercise objective judgement on corporate affairs, independent, 
in particular, from management’. Participation of independent board 
members in decision-making is recommended and ‘boards should assign a 
sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising 
independent judgement to tasks where there is potential for conflict of 
interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are financial reporting, 
nomination and executive and board remuneration’. In its section on 
shareholder rights, the OECD recommends that ‘markets for corporate 
control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent 
manner’ and that ‘anti-takeover measures should not be used to shield 
management from accountability’ (OECD, 1999, pp.29-30 and 43-44).  
                                                 
1 Although it is questionable whether a ‘global standard’ really exists, the expression is 
used here to indicate governance ideas influenced by the OECD guidelines or reminiscent 
of US practice. 
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The so-called company with committees system, which was introduced via 
an amendment to the Commercial Code in 2002, introduced features that 
were compatible with this approach.   From the implementation of the law 
in 2003, where companies chose to opt into the new model, they had to 
place external directors on the board and ensure that that they formed a 
majority in the three key committees that control nomination, 
remuneration and audit. In addition, the new law theoretically drew a line 
between the executive function of corporate management, and the 
monitoring and supervising functions of the board.  The daily running of 
the company was to become the responsibility of executive officers whose 
status and position was distinct from that of board-level directors.  Many 
would have agreed with the assessment of one commentator that these and 
other changes, such as liberalisation of share repurchase and options, and a 
general move towards non-mandatory rules, ‘marked a radical shift in the 
fundamental ideas of Japanese corporate law.  The new idea appears to be 
a market-oriented one’ (Kozuka, 2006, p.9).  Miyauchi Yoshihiko, 
chairman of ORIX – which was one of the first companies to adopt the 
new system – said in a newspaper interview in June 2003: ‘The 
opportunity created by the Commercial Code amendment has for the 
moment divided up those firms that take governance seriously and those 
that do not’ (Nikkei Sangyō, 2003).  The new Company Law which came 
into force in 2006 is largely a codifying measure, formally removing 
company law from the main body of the Commercial Code, but some 
further changes to the rules relating to corporate governance have recently 
been introduced, including a greater emphasis on the importance of robust 
internal audit processes. 
 
In addition to these legal changes, a further series of developments began 
in 2005, as hostile bid approaches triggered litigation over the rights of 
companies to implement defensive measures.  Shortly after court rulings 
had restrained frustrating tactics by a target company in March, the 
Ministry of Justice and METI published joint guidelines on takeover bids 
in May of that year.  According to a widely held view, ‘Delaware law was 
adopted wholesale’ in the guidelines, which represent ‘the intellectual 
appeal of the Delaware model in the world today’; however, as Milhaupt 
further observed, ‘Discerning the significance of Japan’s emerging 
takeover market and related legal developments requires nuanced 
comparative assessments of how legal standards and governance 
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technologies whose evolution is deeply enmeshed with the U.S. political 
economy will operate in a very different institutional setting’ (Milhaupt, 
2006, pp.200-201 and 203). 
 
In this paper we report empirical findings from case studies which were 
aimed at examining the way in which companies have responded to these 
legal reforms and other developments.  Section 2 below sets out the 
methods used.  In Section 3 we present our findings under four headings: 
varieties of board structure in companies with committees; perspectives on 
external directors and corporate auditors; the impact of governance reform 
on management structures and practices; and the reaction to the increased 





The case study interviews were carried out in September 2006. One 
objective of the research was to investigate how far the polarised view of 
‘traditionalists’ versus ‘modernisers’ was borne out at firm level.  We 
conducted interviews at a range of companies, some of which had 
outwardly ‘traditional’ structures, and some of which were companies 
with committees.  We also discussed the same topics and situations with 
representatives of external agencies which we considered to have the 
ability to influence corporate governance behaviour, to have experience of 
the formulation processes behind recent reforms, or to have knowledge of 
market sentiment, in order to hear their views on the current situation and 
gain some idea of the forces generally at work. In this connection we 
spoke to a selection of academics who were active in governance studies 
or had taken part in the consultation process for new legislation or 
guidelines, government ministries, a politician, a major institutional 
investor, a lawyer, various trade associations and two serving external 
directors.  
The study comprised 24 interviews. Of these, nine were conducted at eight 
companies, comprising three companies with committees (four interviews) 
and five other companies (five interviews), and 15 were conducted with 
the external agencies above (15 interviews). This study was linked to a 
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similarly constructed but wider exercise carried out in late 2003 and 2004 
which compared actual governance practice to the theoretical style of the 
formal or informal structural changes that many companies had recently 
introduced at that time (see Buchanan, 2006, Buchanan, 2007). Since all 
but two of the companies and several of the external agencies visited in 
2006 had been visited also during the earlier exercise, much of these 
discussions focused on comparison of the situations revealed in 2003-4 
and those pertaining in 2006. Four of the corporate interviews were with 
chairmen or chief executives and the others were with directors, senior 
executive officers, corporate auditors and middle management. 
All the interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis. In all except 
two instances they were recorded and transcribed, and Atlas-ti was used to 
organise the data under code families for analysis. Further data quoted 
here were obtained from published documents, principally the press, 
corporate annual reports, and information issued by various trade and 
business associations.2 
 
III. CORPORATE RESPONSES TO COMPANY LAW 
REFORM: CASE STUDY EVIDENCE 
A. VARIETIES OF BOARD STRUCTURE IN COMPANIES WITH 
COMMITTEES  
 
As we have seen, the ‘company with committees’ model was held up by 
its supporters in Japan as an exemplar of ‘global practice’. In practice, the 
amendments made to the Commercial Code allowed several deviations 
from the style of reform suggested by the OECD’s principles.  There was 
                                                 
2  The work forms part of a wider project based at the University of Cambridge which is 
analysing legal change and its relationship to financial development and organisational 
change in a range of countries; although the approach adopted here is entirely qualitative, 
it is intended to complement it with quantitative studies including the construction of 
indices measuring legal change over time 
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm). 
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no requirement for a majority of external directors on the board, the same 
external directors could serve concurrently on the three statutory 
committees so that the minimum requirement was only for two, and it was 
permissible for directors and executives to have joint roles. Moreover the 
external directors could include officers of parent companies and are best 
described as ‘external’ (the common Japanese term is shagai, meaning 
‘external to the company’) rather than as ‘independent’.  All the 
companies with committees which we visited had taken advantage of these 
effective derogations to some degree. 
As at 21st December 2006, a net 105 companies had formally gone over to 
the new system, while nine others had transferred but subsequently 
reverted to the old system (JCAA, 2006); the total may seem small (and it 
is inflated by the inclusion of at least 45 companies that are either 
subsidiaries or firms under effective external control for other reasons), 
but it includes some of the best-known of the globally-orientated Japanese 
companies which came to the fore in the post-war period.  We will 
consider three cases which illustrate the variety of ways in which the 
company with committees system operates in practice.   
The first was a medium-sized listed company which was one of the first to 
move over to the new system in 2003.  The founding family continued to 
hold a major shareholding, and a family member was its CEO; according 
to a director, ‘there was no external pressure’ for the change, and ‘there 
was a good deal of debate at first about whether proceeding in this way 
was a good idea or not’, but ‘the CEO forced it through’.  In the new 
board, seven of the ten directors were external and five of these had 
managerial experience; they appeared to be genuinely external, 
independent and qualified to supervise the business.  The company 
appointed only three employees to the formal position of executive officer: 
these were the president (CEO), COO (also a director), and the CFO.   
 
Following the change, a clearer demarcation between supervision and 
execution was established; as it was put to us, the two executive directors 
‘have been made directors in order to explain to the board what the 
executives are doing and what they plan to do’.  Nevertheless, the three-
person executive committee decided issues of strategy such as mergers 
and acquisitions, to the extent of determining whether to make hostile bids 
for other companies. The director we interviewed described the situation: 
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‘with the move to become a Company with Committees, what you might 
call the big shareholders concentrated on supervision and the executive 
officers actually ran the business - I think that’s frankly one way to look at 
it’.  
 
The second company, which is large and important in its field within 
Japan, had four external directors (roughly 30% in a total board of 13) 
who clearly met criteria of independence in terms of their previous careers 
and declared interests. In addition, there was one other non-executive 
director, who was an internal appointee. Two of the external directors had 
management experience but the other two had been recruited for their 
specialist knowledge. The chairman described his policy in selecting these 
people:  
 
‘We chose these specialists and professional businesspeople in order to 
maintain a good balance in the management of our business and in our 
governance. We felt that if they were here they would watch over our 
business and conduct our governance for us…’ 
When asked whether they participated fully in decision-making processes, 
his reply, while affirmative, stressed their advisory role: 
‘Yes. They take part in it. That is, they come up with opinions all the time 
at board meetings and you see we on the board pay a great deal of respect 
to the opinions of these external directors.’  
The perception was that the four external directors were a source of advice 
for the nine internal appointees, and that ‘the board’ was somehow distinct 
from these individuals. 
The nomination and compensation committees each comprised the 
company chairman (who was an executive director) as the committee 
chairman, one executive director and three of the four external directors. 
The audit committee comprised two of the external directors and the non-
executive internal director as committee chairman. In none of these 
instances, therefore, was a committee entrusted entirely to external 
control, and in all cases the chairmen were internal.  
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Although the separation of management from monitoring was clearly 
acknowledged, the ambiguous position of the internal directors could not 
be avoided.  The chairman commented on his own executive role as 
follows:  
 
‘Now, really, I’m the chairman and it would really be better if I didn’t 
have a joint role as an executive officer. You see I chair the board 
meetings as the company chairman. Well, it would be consistent to do that 
but, the way I see it, I feel that if I’m in a position of supervising I need to 
have information about execution in order to supervise what they are 
doing properly and in order to do this I need to see what is going on 
among the executive officers, right down to the executive officer 
meetings. It’s a sort of information gathering exercise.’ 
 
There appeared therefore to be an underlying belief that it is not possible 
for the board to function without having a strong link to the executive arm. 
In the case of the chairman, this amounted only to the need for an 
‘information gathering exercise’, but all except one of the internally 
promoted core of the board, who continued to drive the firm’s strategy, 
were also executives. 
 
The third company is very large and has a major international presence. At 
the time of our interviews it had four external directors who met the 
criteria for independence but none of them had direct industrial experience 
and they could more readily be described as specialists than as managers. 
In addition to these external directors, there were three internally 
promoted non-executive directors, including the chairman, and seven 
internally promoted executive directors, including the president, giving a 
total board of 14 split equally between executives and non-executives.   
 
The chairman described the logic behind this structure:  
 
‘Our board has 14 members, but if we make the numbers equal, with 
seven of each, even if - for the sake of argument - the executive directors 
have to hold execution-side opinions, the board works on majority 
decisions, so in the first place nothing happens unless there is agreement 
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The external directors’ role appeared to be seen as advisory: ‘we have 
introduced specialists from all sorts of sectors, with their expertise, so 
these people bring heavy-weight opinions….into our group of directors’.  
The dual role of the internal directors as both managers and monitors was 
explicitly recognised, but rather than being seen as a potential weakness, 
was viewed as a strength of the new arrangements.  The seven executive 
directors comprised the president, the CFO, the chief risk management 
officer and the four operational heads of the company’s main divisions, 
thus ensuring that the company’s entire business spectrum was reflected in 
its board: ‘the reason why we chose these seven is that they, including the 
CEO, as directors must run each of their businesses from the viewpoint of 
the stakeholders’.  This was a conscious policy decision, as the chairman 
explained:  
 
‘Although our current structure differs from the American style, where the 
CEO has become virtually the only one there with executive powers and 
fundamentally, apart from him, it’s an external style of structure, we are 
discussing matters by involving people who have a better familiarity with 
how the company operates… it is not possible to reach decisions on things 
like the company’s culture and matters of [similar] importance through 
discussions with external directors’.  
 
This contrast with what was seen as the paradigmatic American structure 
was also emphasised by the chairman of the second company referred to 
above:  
 
‘Now we became a company with committees but precisely a Japanese 
one. This is very different from an American company with committees’. 
 
These first three situations illustrate the wide variety of forms which can 
exist within the company with committees system.  For the two large, 
widely held companies, external supervision and advice were introduced 
into what remained, essentially, executive boards aligned to the demands 
of the businesses; for the first company it became a format for further 
concentrating control of the business in the hands of a family CEO and his 
closest subordinates, while providing a new element of external 
supervision which was nevertheless of limited intensity. In all cases, the 
site of decisive power had not significantly shifted. 
 




B. PERSPECTIVES ON EXTERNAL DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE 
AUDITORS 
 
External directors are a compulsory element of the company with 
committees system but they are also present at many other companies in 
Japan. According to the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s survey of all TSE-listed 
companies’ corporate governance returns from 2006 (published 2007)3, 
42.3% of all TSE-listed companies had external directors and the figure 
for those using the corporate auditor system, thus excluding those that are 
obliged to appoint external directors by virtue of being companies with 
committees, was 40.83%. The average number of external directors for 
those companies with corporate auditor systems that had appointed any 
was 1.76 per company (TSE, 2007, pp.14-15).   
 
Although there is a tradition of inviting outsiders to participate in Japanese 
boards they are seldom seen as independent agents. The TSE white paper 
quoted above reported that 82.7% of external directors at all TSE-listed 
companies were persons who had retired from unaffiliated companies 4, 
with all but 5.1% of the remainder being specialists of some kind (TSE, 
2007, p.18) but this would not exclude persons from companies with 
trading relationships. A major Japanese institutional investor summarised 
common perceptions when interviewed in 2004:  
 
‘...they all come from trading partners or banks or insurers. They all have 
some inter-group, mutual transaction background to them. There are not 
many of them and they are not independent. Then there’s the question of 
what they actually do: external directors are there to check the 
management of the firm with external eyes but they hardly ever carry out 
that function. In Japan, they are advisers.’  
 
                                                 
3 Data were obtained from corporate returns responding to question lists published by the 
exchange; where responses were textual, keyword searches were used. 
4 As defined in terms of shareholding and special ability to influence decisions. 
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In the particular case of 318 companies where a specific parent company 
was identified, 65.7% of the external directors appointed came from the 
parents, suggesting that promoting group cohesion, rather than being 
independent, was the main function of these candidates (TSE, 2007, p.20).  
 
A company president we interviewed in 2006, who had no external 
directors in his company but had recently created an advisory board, 
summed up what is probably the general view among those in favour of 
external involvement when he described his new advisors:  
 
‘There’s an element of externalism in this structure as well: this aspect of 
reflecting all these people’s opinions in our management is perhaps not the 
same as the external board members that you were talking about, but in the 
sense of being a mechanism that reflects what is in many respects a breath 
of outside air and outside thinking onto our internal organisation, I think 
it’s a very useful thing’.  
 
One of his board colleagues added this clarification: ‘the sum of it is that 
when they give opinions that provide advice, the president is ready to 
listen to them, but I don’t think there is an aspect of constraining the 
president’s power present there’. 
 
Several persons interviewed commented that there was a lack of suitable 
candidates for external directorships. An officer of an association 
commented, in the context of a discussion of the concentration of power 
among the committees in the company with committees system: ‘you see, 
the reason that the committees were given precisely such powers is 
because it was not possible to externalise half of the whole board of 
directors’. An officer at another association made a similar comment: ‘As 
a practical issue, the supply of suitable candidates for external directors - 
the supply of appropriate people - is limited’.  
 
Even when candidates could be found, there was doubt as to their 
suitability. The officer of the second association quoted above observed 
that companies which had initially become companies with committees 
and had then reverted to the ‘traditional’ style had told him that ‘there 
were still all sorts of weaknesses and faults’ with regard to how far the 
external directors understood the running of the companies, their grasp of 
the actual situation and their ability to make appropriate decisions. A 
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lawyer who had acted as an external corporate auditor commented on this 
problem from the other side:  
 
‘Generally lawyers and accountants are potential candidates for 
independent directors and auditors. Certainly we’re independent but not 
good at business - at understanding’.  
 
An officer at one of the above associations recounted the story of one such 
candidate:  
 
‘This is something that we have actually heard from senior management at 
a company: that company appointed a jurist with experience as a high 
court judge. So he was very useful in setting up compliance matters 
regarding the company’s legal side but he had no idea about what was 
going on in the company….So he was called ‘external director’ but the 
fact was that he was just a legal adviser’. 
 
Some companies, mostly companies with committees, do give their 
external directors a degree of real power and the external directors at Sony 
are popularly credited with expediting their company’s change of CEO in 
2005. However, in the  interviews which we conducted, external directors 
were often described as isolated within the companies in which they held 
office. A corporate auditor at a company with external directors which was 
not a company with committees observed:  
 
‘I think they feel they’re very isolated. They do not have access routes to 
the real company. They see something like a virtual company which is 
pure and 100% perfect, and they are asked to make a judgement, and I 
think they sometimes feel very uncomfortable about this situation’.  
One external director, who enjoyed great prestige from his earlier career 
and was both an external director and an external corporate auditor at 
several companies, told us:  
 
‘At other companies where I am an external director, the number of 
externals is small, so the situation is that there’s a feeling of their being 
outsiders’.  
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‘The externals are not determining the companies’ strategy…. They can’t 
do that. You see, people who have been in the company for a long time, 
who bear executive responsibility, put together the strategy, then they 
obtain the approval of the external people on the board of directors, the 
matter is decided and then they implement it’.  
 
This view was substantiated by the president of a medium-sized listed 
company which is not a company with committees but has appointed some 
external directors. When asked about these external directors’ direct 
involvement in major issues, he said:  
 
‘Actually, to give an example, with strategy - when we decide the mid-
term plan, for example - we get them to give final approval but they are 
not involved in the process of deciding it. That is decided internally’. 
Moreover he and his internal directors met once every two weeks for a 
discussion of major business and administration issues without involving 
their external colleagues. 
 
When the move to the company with committees system was opened to 
public discussion by METI and the Ministry of Justice around 2001, the 
principal employers’ association, the Keidanren, made its opposition to 
compulsory introduction of external directors very clear (Imai, 2001) and 
this is believed to have been a major reason why the system was launched 
as an option only. A civil servant offered a personal opinion on the general 
situation regarding external directors:  
 
‘…while externals have appeared on the business scene in our country’s 
rather particular situation, unless the restrictions that come from the 
lifetime employment system and from the kind of people who become 
directors are somehow broken, whoever is brought along as an external, 
the exercise is pointless. You see, there has hitherto been enormous 
sensitivity - indeed there still is - towards the fact that these people are 
external, that they haven’t worked at the company. This aspect is perhaps 
one where our approach is very different from the debate in America, 
Europe or the OECD about requirements for external and independent 
directors. In other words, the fact that these people have not worked for 
the CEO has now become the most important issue in this country. Now 
this being as it is, when it comes to deciding how to take things forward, 
this has hitherto been a matter of great importance and, as such, it has 
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aroused very strong resistance, but what we have to do is to advance 
slowly, step by step, in this direction, changing the system.’ 
 
Several of those interviewed emphasised aspects such as ‘lack of 
suitability’ or the lack of supply of ‘suitable’ candidates as problems and 
this raises the question of what ‘suitability’ might entail.  The main criteria 
that emerged in our interviews were: understanding of the company’s 
operations, understanding of what was happening day-to-day, and the 
ability to make informed decisions.  Familiarity with the CEO was a 
further factor noted by the civil servant quoted above.  The sort of person 
most likely to fulfil all of these requirements would be precisely an insider 
who had spent an entire career at that company; this is clearly not an easy 
role for an outsider to undertake.  Not unsurprisingly, members of 
management whom we met, most of whom had been internally promoted, 
held views about the desired characteristics of corporate directors which 
were largely attuned to their own backgrounds.  External directors who 
have no pretensions to be other than purveyors of specialist advice 
probably fall into a different category: they appear to be isolated from the 
real governance of the companies on whose boards they sit by implicit 
mutual consent. 
 
What of the great majority of companies which had not moved over to the 
new system and still theoretically rely on corporate auditors to supervise 
their governance?  In several cases in our sample, these companies had 
adopted elements of the companies with committees structure, including 
often the creation of an executive officer class below board level and the 
introduction of external directors on to the board, while retaining the 
characteristic feature of the traditional regime: a board of ‘corporate 
auditors’ with responsibility for overseeing the main board.  The corporate 
auditor system had been strengthened in legislation of the early 2000s 
which made the appointment of outsider auditors mandatory.  There were 
some who argued, like the chairman of one company with committees, 
that:  
 
‘At the end of the day, corporate auditors can’t function, you know. You 
see, in Japan, old-style corporate auditors have been dragged into the 
present unmodified. What use are people like corporate auditors? There 
are plenty of them who don’t know anything about auditing – they cannot 
make judgements, you see’. 
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However, others argued that the corporate auditor system, by bringing 
together insiders (normally former executives) with outside auditors, and 
with a clear division of responsibility between execution and supervision, 
was working well. A corporate auditor commented: 
 
‘I think a good point of the corporate auditor system is the combination of 
internal auditors and external auditors. I think that the function of auditors 
is to provide a final resource to the members of the board [of directors]. 
What I would like to say is that we have outside [corporate audit] board 
members who really are professionals. We have outside corporate auditors 
who are super-high flying managers… These big high-flying – how do 
you say? “VIPs”? - can say something to the management. I think they can 
- simply because they are members of the board of auditors - give a 
message to the board of directors of the companies. If something wrong is 
going on, then we internal auditors can speak to the outside auditors and 
then the outside auditors can speak in a board meeting. That cycle, or that 
safety valve, is really working.’ 
 
What this suggests is that a large range of companies, some of which have 
gone over to the new system and some of which have not, have 
implemented a greater stress on external monitoring, whether in the form 
of external directors or through the amended corporate auditor system.   
External directors and auditors alike are seen as having an important role 
as advisers and as a ‘safety valve’ for management.  However, in both 
instances there is a perception of limits to the effective action which 
outsiders can take on strategic matters, which arises from the importance 
attached to knowledge and experience of the internal workings of the firm. 
 
C. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE REFORM ON MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES 
 
The firms we interviewed who had moved over to the company with 
committees system all identified greater streamlining and efficiency of 
decision-making as one of the main consequences of their decision.  This 
stemmed from a number of factors: clarifying the monitoring role of the 
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board and, conversely, removing from it certain executive functions, 
which were now vested in executive managerial structures; and 
establishing the new class of executive officers below the level of board 
director.  As one company told us, ‘the first objective in becoming a 
company with committees like this was to speed up the decision-making 
and to be able to transfer all the authority to the executive officers…that 
was the big thing’.   
 
In the case of one large company with committees mentioned in section A. 
above, executive committees were restructured following the adoption of 
the company with committees structure.  The board, as described 
previously, was set up with equal numbers of executive and non-executive 
directors.  Of the non-executives, three, including the chairman, were 
former executives; these were members of the main executive committee 
and were entitled to attend its meetings and to see the process by which 
the president arrived at a final decision.  In this way, a link to the wider 
board was provided.  When asked whether these new arrangements were 
translating into results for the company, our interviewee, a senior 
executive officer, replied: 
 
‘Yes. I think it’s fair to say that by having the schematic or the 
organisation of these layers today here at [the company], plus having a 
CEO like [the then incumbent], I can say that we now have a very efficient 
process for big decisions and also very good communication with the 
executives of the various companies to guide - to lead - their management, 
not only in the day-to-day operation but also as a kind of discussion 
regarding the direction of their marketing and the businesses. I think it is 
already working and as you see already [in] the bottom line of our profit 
and loss statements, [the company] has changed.’ 
 
However, this point of view was not confined to companies with 
committees.  In several other companies, similar moves had been taken.  
In one company which had no external directors at all, an executive officer 
category had nevertheless been established below board level.  A member 
of middle management observed: ‘We introduced this management system 
and actually the purpose of this new reorganisation is the speed-up of our 
business operations – that means a quick business machine – plus 
clarification of the role and responsibility of our top management’.  The 
new management structure, which had been put in place at roughly the 
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same time that the company with committees law came into force, set out 
in detail the structures by which senior management committees reported 
to the board and received feedback; the role of auditors (who were seen as 
advising but not as having a veto over decisions); and the role of an 
international advisory board.  This was not a company which placed great 
emphasis on transparency to outsiders regarding all aspects of its 
management processes: on the contrary, the purpose of the international 
advisory board was to help management, not to reassure shareholders. 
 
The reform of managerial structures in large Japanese companies may, in 
some cases, have been triggered by the legal reforms of the early 2000s, 
but it was not confined to companies opting into the new structure.  
Companies such as Toyota and Canon which had refused to move over to 
the new system were seen by other corporate managements as having less 
need to do so, on the grounds that they had already implemented many of 
the structural changes which, elsewhere, were delayed until the onset of 
more structural corporate governance reform.  As the chairman of a very 
large company in an unrelated sector put it,  
 
‘The point here – I don’t know whether one should call it an omission – is 
that, for example, companies like Toyota and Canon, from our point of 
view, are some of the first movers among Japanese companies and began 
to change their business structures early on: probably in the beginning of 
the 1990s, they responded very quickly to a sort of globalisation and 
spread of networking, with the result that they came to have very sound 
structures. Now although the top people at these various companies talk a 
lot about their Japanese-style management, in fact from that time they 
were already building a management style and structure suited to the 
environment of the 21st century. That’s why the companies that are not 
making efforts to reform their corporate governance further are the 
companies that currently have good results and began to reform their 
structures 10 years back.’ 
 
There were other views.  Some of our respondents took a line which was 
more fundamentally opposed to the traditional model and to the idea that it 
could successfully adapt to changing demands in an incremental way.  
According to one of our interviewees, who served as an external director 
and external corporate auditor in several different companies,  
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‘In Japan in a strict sense there is no management, there are just people in 
companies who are just cooperating – there is no real tough management 
and there is no leadership – just cooperation. So there is no real 
management as a modern management system – in the modern meaning of 
‘management’. So people don’t think we need corporate governance. If 
there is no management, then no governance. It’s very typical – very 
symbolic.’ 
 
Related to this was the view, put to us by an institutional investor, that 
even in companies which had appointed external directors, little had 
changed: 
 
‘Even though external directors are introduced just as an outward form, 
there is still no supporting structure, no organisation to allow these people 
to function properly. So they are just being introduced as a façade. There 
are a lot of companies that are just adding them as a decoration. Therefore 
when one carries out a questionnaire survey there are companies that 
appear to be good in purely external terms, but in reality, when one does 
not rely just on these questionnaires and actually goes to visit and asks all 
sorts of questions, this turns out to be just a façade: the contents are not 
working, they are not functioning, and there are plenty of companies like 
that, you know. That’s why I don’t pay attention to this kind of 
information now. You see there are still many companies like this in Japan 
which are just attaching a façade, just decoration.’ 
 
A politician whom we interviewed emphasised Japan’s historical cycle of 
periodic governance reform in response to scandals and the need for 
continuing reform henceforth to ensure that the current situation does not 
prove to be merely a repetition of this: 
 
‘Later on - though I hate to say it - scandals occur so everyone is criticised 
for these and then we have tension once more: this is just not a systematic 
way of doing things. It’s an external pressure: scandals occur, so all that 
happens is that there is tension once again and we take a new look at 
things and we strengthen them. My feeling is that if we just leave matters 
as they are, there’s a danger that they will gradually stop functioning in 
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Whether a fundamental change is occurring in Japanese managerial 
practice is difficult to judge from the evidence that we have. We can 
nevertheless point to significant differences in perceptions of the 
relationship between governance reform and managerial change.  Senior 
managers of some of the very large companies which have long played a 
dominant role in the Japanese economy see governance in instrumental 
terms, that is, as a means to the end of putting in place the kind of 
streamlined decision-making structures which were thought to be 
impossible under the traditional system. The diminution in the size of 
boards (some of which used to have as many as 50 or 60 members in 
extreme cases) and the separation of execution and monitoring were, 
according to this point of view, the much-needed catalyst which enabled 
senior managers to initiate overdue organisational reforms.  This view is 
posed against a position, associated with some institutional investors and 
those who have long argued for a closer alignment of the Japanese model 
with American practice, which doubts whether any significant changes 
have taken place in corporate culture and practice, and which sees the 
governance reforms of the 2000s as cosmetic, precisely because they did 
not go far enough to enhance transparency and external accountability. 
 
Which view of the trajectory of Japanese corporate governance turns out 
to be correct remains to be seen.  One indication that certain large 
companies may well have made more than superficial changes is the 
recognition on the part of senior management that the process of reform is 
by no means risk-free.  The ‘traditional’ system depended on the capacity 
of a large group of managerial insiders to oversee, through mutual 
monitoring, the performance of the small number among them who had 
climbed to very top of the managerial structure.  Thanks to the separation 
of the executive officer class from board-level directors, and the reduced 
opportunities for promotion to board level which this, together with the 
reduction in the size of boards, implies, this kind of monitoring will be 
less feasible in future.  It was put to us that the concentration of excessive 
power in the hands of CEOs might make it more difficult to guard against 
the possibility of strategic errors and mismanagement at top level.  
Another problem pointed out to us was the need to ensure the formal 
systems of internal controls which were replacing the informal system of 
mutual monitoring were truly effective, as the chairman of a very large 
company (which has in fact recently reinforced its internal inspection 
function) suggested: 
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‘The one thing that I am personally worried about, that I feel needs to be 
done, is strengthening of our internal control system… At our current level 
of audit competence, I have the feeling that the arrangements we have put 
in place for auditing perhaps lack the ability to move in on the real heart of 
problems, that our audits are maybe a bit superficial. It may be that I am 
seeing problems where none exist but I feel that we need to improve our 
audit competence a little bit more and that we need to give it more ability 
to seek out things such as dealing with intrinsic dangers in the organisation 
before they become problematical and looking at the business with regard 
to illegalities. So that’s why I think that we should continue with our board 
governance arrangements just as they are for a while but I would like to 
look a little more closely at matters surrounding internal controls.’ 
 
D. REACTION TO THE INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILE 
TAKEOVER BIDS 
 
The corporate governance debate in Japan is no longer quite as intense at 
it was in the early 2000s. Although the topic is still discussed, it no longer 
features so regularly in the press as an urgent matter. A close observer of 
the Japanese corporate scene told us:  
 
‘Stock prices have improved dramatically compared to 2003, the overall 
economy has improved - that’s taken some of the pressure off. A lot of the 
impetus for focus on corporate governance reform was really the 
underperformance of the equity markets and the implications that had for 
the Japanese pension system’.  
 
A civil servant commented on the current situation regarding companies’ 
choices between different governance systems: ‘…how things will move 
is perhaps not clearly established: there’s still fluidity with regard to which 
way all the pieces will move, and it’s probably necessary to wait a while 
to see how they settle down’. Public attention has focused more recently 
on a single but nevertheless critical aspect of wider corporate governance: 
anti-takeover strategies and defences.  
 
Because most large Japanese companies are widely-held joint stock 
companies as well as community firms, a fundamental inconsistency exists 
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between their legal structure and the practice of most corporate 
managements. Ownership of these companies is vested in freely 
negotiable shares, but both management and workforce tend to resist the 
idea of outsiders taking sudden control of the company by buying a 
majority of these shares and then threatening to interfere (as they would 
see it) in the running of the business. In the past, one solution was to 
encourage stable shareholdings by trading partners, often in the form of 
mutual cross-shareholdings, which were already an accepted way of 
demonstrating a long-term business association between companies. 
During the period 1965-1974, when weak equity prices and market 
liberalisation measures caused concern that foreign or domestic predators 
might seek control of Japanese companies, these shareholdings increased 
sharply: the overall stable shareholding ratio of listed companies 
(including cross-shareholdings) is estimated to have risen from 47.4% in 
1965 to 62.2% in 1974 (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2005, pp.5-6). However, 
these shareholdings were already in decline by the early 1990s, leaving 
many companies with increasingly liquid shareholder bases. Statistics 
from NLI Research (Nissei Kiso Kenkyūjo) show a decline in stable 
shareholdings by market value in a population of listed companies 
numbering 2,161 in 1993 and rising to 2,690 in 2003, from 45.2% in 1993 
to 24.3% in 2003. Pure cross-shareholdings, which are included within the 
stable shareholding totals, declined from 17.6% in 1993 to 7.6% in 2003 
(NLI Research, 2004). 
 
In February 2005 Livedoor, an internet services provider, tried to take 
control of Nippon Broadcasting System (‘NBS’), a radio broadcaster, 
through a hostile bid. This attempt proved to be a watershed in the recent 
history of mergers and acquisitions in Japan whose ‘net result was not a 
return to business as before’(Whittaker and Hayakawa, 2007. p.16). A 
great attraction of the target was the fact that NBS, through a cross-
shareholding arrangement, was the dominant shareholder in Fuji 
Television, which in turn dominated the Fuji-Sankei media group. Various 
factors made this attempt, which was ultimately thwarted, a stimulus for 
widespread anti-takeover precautions by companies across Japan. The first 
alarming factor was that Livedoor, despite assurances to the contrary, 
appeared to be predatory and speculative: its approach was reminiscent of 
the greenmailers who had extorted money from Japanese companies in the 
1970s and 1980s, and Okuda Hiroshi, chairman of Toyota and of the 
Keidanren, immediately drew a parallel with T. Boone Pickens’ attempt 
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on Koito Seisakusho in 1989-1990 when he acquired shares from a 
suspected Japanese greenmailer and demanded board representation. 
Speaking as Keidanren chairman, Mr. Okuda is reported to have said that 
Livedoor’s president should clarify whether he was seeking to restructure 
Fuji Sankei Group or was simply trying to make a speculative profit, like 
T. Boone Pickens – the implication being that, in the latter case, society 
should close ranks against him (Nikkei, 2005a). The second alarming 
factor was that when NBS sought to dilute Livedoor’s shareholding by 
issuing new share rights, two courts successively declared this move 
illegal. At least one fairly recent precedent existed which should have 
warned NBS’s management that such a move might not be permitted but 
the effect was to remind boards across Japan that their legally permitted 
ability to issue authorised but hitherto unissued shares or to distribute 
rights without shareholder approval was not a sure defence against hostile 
takeover. It is interesting that a small-scale snap survey by Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun at the time found that a majority of the company presidents and 
all the investors polled considered that the courts’ decisions were correct 
(Nikkei, 2005b). 
 
The situation was considered sufficiently serious for the Ministry of 
Justice and METI to issue joint guidelines in May 2005 in an effort to 
show what sort of anti-takeover defences might be considered in the 
corporate interest and what levels of external supervision might be 
appropriate to sanction the actions of internally promoted directors in this 
regard (METI and MOJ, 2005). A civil servant described the thinking 
behind this move:  
 
‘Ultimately, unless the judgement is one that includes external people, it 
will not be clear whether these actions are lawful or not.  The incumbents 
might make a correct judgement but the important thing is to demonstrate 
that it is correct…At the end of the day this is a guideline - a guidance for 
people’s reference - and it has no legal power of compulsion, but it sounds 
a warning bell for people at companies and is intended to make them 
understand that this is a topic where they need to make an effort not to be 
suspected of acting unlawfully’. 
 
In July 2006 there was a further demonstration that companies were not 
safe from hostile attentions when Ōji Paper approached Hokuetsu Paper 
with a view to buying the company and then launched a hostile bid when 
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its offer was refused. Hokuetsu’s strategy was to cultivate local financial 
and political relationships and ultimately to allocate sufficient new shares 
to Mitsubishi Corporation and Nippon Paper that by the end of August 
2006 Ōji had no hope of acquiring a majority shareholding and withdrew 
its offer. Perhaps mindful of NBS’s problems with the courts and of the 
recent official guidelines, Hokuetsu took the precaution of obtaining a 
favourable opinion on its share allocations from an independent committee 
that included two of its outside corporate auditors, in order to protect itself 
from accusations that its board had acted purely to protect its own 
interests. The psychological impact of this affair was possibly even greater 
than that of the Livedoor offer for NBS, because both Ōji and Hokuetsu 
are mainstream industrial companies; if such things could happen between 
companies such as this, many other companies would see themselves as 
exposed to the possibility of a bid. 
 
The result of these developments was that many Japanese companies 
began to formulate defensive strategies against the possibility of takeover. 
Although Livedoor and Ōji are both Japanese companies, much of the 
concern was focused on the possibility of foreign acquirers becoming 
active in Japan; increasingly aggressive moves by foreign private equity 
firms had revived fears of foreign predators. Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
reported in February 2007 that a total of 197 companies had announced 
anti-takeover strategies (Nikkei, 2007). Stronger companies which we 
visited in September 2006 considered that they were not at immediate risk. 
The president of one company commented to us:  
 
‘…if we create a situation whereby there is a reasonable profit distribution 
and a sound share price, my feeling at present is that there is really no 
need to introduce defensive measures, or any of the legal stuff that it 
entails, in the immediate future. However, this all depends on the 
situation’.  
 
Nevertheless, his company already had a task force studying this topic. 
 
In our contacts with companies and other entities, we asked why external 
committees were considered necessary for approval of defensive measures 
when companies could either put the matter to a vote of their shareholders 
or even rely on their existing corporate auditors to monitor the actions of 
the board (assuming that companies with committees would have external 
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supervision already in place). In fact the schedule for calling general 
meetings of shareholders in Japan makes it difficult to arrange voting 
quickly in response to takeover approaches but we considered this to be a 
logistical problem which could be solved if there was the appropriate will.  
 
Perhaps the most revealing comment with regard to referring matters to 
shareholders came from the chairman of a company who named a major 
Japanese company with an aggregate majority of foreign shareholders as 
an example of why it was not feasible just to leave reaction to bids and 
defensive measures to the shareholders’ vote:  
 
‘So if it became a question of someone trying to acquire [company name], 
if a shareholders’ meeting were held - if they asked everyone to gather 
together…51% would raise their hands and that would be the end of it, 
wouldn’t it? There’s a huge risk of that, you see’.  
 
This also illustrates a curious aspect of the current concern regarding 
hostile takeovers.  Foreign institutional investors have bought many of the 
shares which have entered the market from the continuing relaxation of 
mutual shareholdings mentioned above and data from the National Stock 
Exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka and Sapporo) show an 
almost unbroken rise in foreign shareholdings from 11.9% of the market in 
1996 to 26.7% in 2005 (National Stock Exchanges, 2006).  Despite the 
fact that both Livedoor and Ōji Paper are Japanese companies, popular 
belief tends to see foreign predators as the real threat. Approaches since 
2003 by Steel Partners of the USA to several Japanese companies, 
culminating in a formal approach to Sapporo Breweries in early 2007 to 
acquire a controlling stake, and recent demands for higher dividends at 
larger companies by foreign activist investors, have encouraged this view, 
although none of these approaches have involved a hostile offer.  The 
removal in May 2007 of the ban on acquisition of Japanese companies by 
locally registered subsidiaries of foreign companies using their parent’s 
shares as currency (so-called ‘triangular transactions’) has prompted 
speculation about what sort of threat this may represent. A survey of most 
of the first and second section companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, reported in its associated newspaper, Nikkei 
Sangyō Shimbun on 26th April 2007 5, found that 48.2% of respondents 
                                                 
5 The survey was sent to 2,105 companies, of which 604 (28.7%) replied. 
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considered that the risk of unwelcome attention from foreign acquirers 
would increase. Although a similar 48.3% felt that nothing would change, 
many of these based their opinion on the fact that there would be a 
reaction from Japanese society as a whole (33.0%) or that cross-
shareholdings and the like would hold them at bay (22.4%). Moreover, 
46.2% considered that incumbent management would be able to withstand 
any approaches of this kind. Buy-out and other private equity funds 
(which are not exclusively foreign but tend to be seen as a foreign 
phenomenon) were seen as short-termist and harmful, although a 
surprisingly high percentage of respondents (53.8%) conceded that they 
created useful tension among managers (Nikkei Sangyō, 2007).  
 
Many large Japanese companies continue to cater to the requirements of 
foreign and domestic institutional shareholders through extensive IR 
activities and it remains to be seen how this encouragement of 
fundamentally uncommitted shareholders can eventually be reconciled 
with growing concerns about the risk of hostile takeover (Jackson and 
Miyajima, 2007, p.20, after Ahmadjian).  The TSE noted that in 2006 
some 8.3% of the first section of the Tokyo market, or 196 companies, had 
30% or more of their total shares in the hands of foreign investors (TSE, 
2007, p.4).  As noted above, some companies are already owned more 
than half in aggregate by foreign shareholders.  
 
One very large company where we held interviews, which is a company 
with committees, had announced in 2005 that if a potentially hostile party 
gathered more than 20% of its shares it would form a special committee 
from its external directors to consider countermeasures. In the face of 
institutional pressure, the company subsequently obtained shareholder 
approval for this concept and limited any defensive measures to one year. 
This shows a certain deference to shareholder sentiment but the basic 
principle remains that the board, albeit including external directors in this 
case, will determine defensive measures.  Moreover, this is a company that 
probably takes its obligations to shareholders more seriously than many. 
 
Reactions to the idea that corporate auditors might monitor the board’s use 
of defensive measures were universally negative. An official at an 
association said: ‘Now it may be, as you pointed out, that fundamentally 
the corporate auditors should decide this, but in Japan no one thinks like 
that’. An officer at another association made a similar comment: ‘I don’t 
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think that Japanese law expects the board of corporate auditors itself to 
decide whether an acquisition is good or not, or to do the sort of things 
that determine how the company moves in any given direction’. A major 
institutional investor conceded that external corporate auditors could have 
some role – although he pointed to Hokuetsu as an example of how 
ineffectual they had proved in practice – but saw them as only a second-
best solution:  
 
‘I think that corporate auditors - especially internal corporate auditors - 
have no independence. Our feeling here is that external directors - that is 
to say, external directors who have independence - are the best solution. 
Then, as the next best candidates, come external corporate auditors with a 
high degree of independence; I think people like this should also be 
permitted, but the highest priority is to have external directors with strong 
independence’. 
 
What is significant in this situation is that no one realistically seems to 
expect that the boards of companies that feel threatened by potential 
predators will relinquish control of defensive strategy. There is lack of 
widespread acceptance that shareholders have a right to deliver companies 
to whomsoever they choose, and a perception that the existing mechanism 
of the corporate auditors, for the vast majority of Japanese companies 
which are not companies with committees, is considered to be incapable of 
restraining the board. Instead the focus has turned to ways in which the 
actions of boards – which are generally accepted to be internally recruited 
and motivated by corporate rather than shareholder considerations – can 
be monitored by external forces to ensure that that they abstain from 
egregiously self-interested policies. The feeling is that because boards are 
sufficiently integrated into their community firms to be unlikely to act 
from selfish interests, the need for external reconfirmation of their acts is a 
precaution rather than an utter necessity. 
 
The background to this situation is a general concern that the community 
firm cannot be abandoned to the caprice of the market and a belief that 
most boards will genuinely have their firm’s interests at heart. The 
president of one company said:  
 
‘I’m not quite sure whether shutting out these sorts of opportunities [i.e. 
bid approaches] can really be called ‘corporate defence’. However - this is 
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a Japanese sort of environment - the fact is that 6,000 people are working 
in our group and hitherto they have always had a great feeling of 
confidence and attachment towards the management. Accordingly, with 
regard to philosophy, even if for the sake of argument someone were to 
appear with a philosophy that was even more elevated than ours, I would 
be very worried and doubtful as to whether these employees who are 
currently contributing their confidence and attachment to us would 
continue to do so in the same way for them’.  
 
An officer at an association confirmed this view:  
 
‘I think there is always the possibility that the incumbent management will 
set defensive measures in motion in order to protect their own positions - 
currently I believe that to be the case. But that’s where incumbent 
management in Japan differs considerably from that of America, in 
particular - and perhaps from that of the U.K. as well - in that, as I 
mentioned earlier, their core is formed from people who have basically 
spent all the past 20 or 30 years at the same company, entering as 
employees - ordinary staff - and you might say that it revolves around 
directors who are the internally promoted senior management; they are 
managers but they also have the role of representing the entire workforce. 
This is a logic that is very familiar to Japanese people but I think perhaps 
it is not understood by people from outside’.  
 
Ironically, the very fact that the vast majority of internally appointed 
corporate directors are unlikely to relinquish control of their companies 
has potentially created a stronger role for external directors and other 
purveyors of independent advice whose objectivity might be recognised in 
a court of law. Whether these external parties will really be capable of 
preventing boards from rejecting offers which shareholders might consider 
advantageous and which could conceivably offer employees a better future 
as part of a more dynamic organisation, remains to be seen, but it does 
seem likely that demand for external directors and advisers will increase. 
 




IV. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
 
The title of this paper suggests that the reaction of Japanese companies to 
recent legal reforms is not quite what meets the eye.  Their response has 
been ‘paradoxical’ for two reasons.   
 
The first is that the changes made to management style and practice did 
not depend on whether the firm in question adopted the company with 
committees system – many companies made the move to more streamlined 
management and greater use of external advice without opting into the 
new legal structure.  Below the level of rhetoric about ‘traditionalists’ and 
‘modernisers’, firms of both varieties were responding to the pressure to 
restructure and reorganise their decision-making processes.  Even within 
the category of firms adopting the company with committees structure, 
there was considerable variation, with some adopting a US-style system of 
majority independent representation on the board, but most retaining a key 
role for internal management at board level.  At the three companies with 
committees visited, executive management appeared to be still firmly in 
control, with the ability of the external directors to intervene decisively at 
some future stage still an unknown quantity.  Thus the impact of the new 
law has been complex.  It has not, for the most part, provided a template 
for abandoning the traditional form of the Japanese company; but it has 
been part of a process which stimulated wider changes in managerial and 
organisational practice. 
 
The second paradox concerns the impact of these changes on the 
underlying model of the Japanese firm.  The Japanese company has long 
been seen as an outlier, representing a particular model which, thanks to 
certain historical contingencies and the inter-connectedness of its defining 
features, ‘more or less contrasts with the corporate system found in the 
West’ (Aoki, 1996, p.33).  Does the adoption of certain ‘western’ practices 
therefore mean that the distinctiveness of the Japanese firm will soon 
fade?  We suggest not. On the contrary, the theme that emerges most 
strongly from our interviews is that the changes which are currently being 
made in both governance and management are more likely to lead to a 
renewal of the ‘community firm’, albeit in a somewhat modified form. 
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A question we set out to address in this paper was: how much adoption of 
a ‘global standard’ of corporate governance has occurred in Japan to date? 
Taking as key elements of the ‘global standard’ the active participation in 
corporate boards by independent external directors who exercise real 
power and supervise corporate activities, and the segregation of 
supervision and execution, the initial conclusion of this study is that not 
much has happened. External supervision is more widespread and more 
tolerated but is still of only limited effect: external directors are often 
treated as advisers and the view that the executive board should be running 
the business persists. There is some formal demarcation between 
supervision and execution, principally in companies with committees, but 
too many directors are still executives for this to be seen as a fundamental 
shift. Indeed there is an instinctive opposition to the idea of directors 
retreating from the executive sphere (Jacoby, 2005, p.170).  Yet, this does 
not imply that the corporate governance reforms have had no impact.  
Both in companies with committees and those retaining traditional 
structures of governance, there has been a move to streamline managerial 
processes and make decision-making more flexible.  The company law 
reforms have provided a wider catalyst for change which is gradually 
being diffused throughout the corporate sector of the economy. 
 
The takeover debate has revealed some interesting aspects of corporate 
governance in Japan in that there is widespread acceptance that most 
boards are internally orientated – although there is little of the automatic 
suspicion of their motives that agency theory might dictate – and that the 
only reasonable way to ensure transparent fairness in a time of crisis is felt 
to be the introduction of external parties into the process of reviewing 
takeover defences. Consigning everything indiscriminately to the decision 
of a majority of shareholders is not, however, considered an option, and no 
one believes that corporate auditors could be trusted to police directors’ 
fulfilment of fiduciary obligations in a bid situation. Instead, the concept 
of external supervision, which was so fiercely opposed by leaders of the 
Japanese business world in 2001, is seen as a reasonable solution. Here, 
again, changes are occurring, but not necessarily along the lines intended 
or envisaged by those who see the establishment of a market for corporate 
control as an essential step in the modernisation of the Japanese economy.  
External supervision has the appearance of an ‘irritant’ factor (Teubner, 
2001, p. 418) which has established itself in Japanese corporate 
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governance and is now adapting itself to a need that was not foreseen 
when the initial debate began, at the end of the 1990s.   
 
Were a US or British-style market for corporate control to come into 
existence in Japan, it is doubtful that the traditional model of the Japanese 
corporation, could survive for very long.  However, the debate over anti-
takeover measures suggests that senior managers in Japan, in contrast to 
their counterparts in the US and Britain (and to an increasing degree in 
mainland Europe), do not see their primary duty, in the context of a 
takeover bid, as maximising shareholder returns; instead they continue to 
see themselves as having a responsibility to maintain the company as an 
organisational entity, for the benefit of a range of interests.  Here, as with 
the company with committees system, an increased degree of externalism 
is not incompatible with the renewal of the pre-existing model, and may, 
indeed, be seen to be one of its preconditions.   
 
Japan’s response to the ‘global standard’ thus appears to be that it has 
absorbed certain ideas and practices but has adapted them to local 
conditions.  A hybrid is evolving which in some respects is ‘unlike either 
the past Japanese model or the US model of corporate governance’ 
(Jackson and Miyajima, 2007, p.32).  Some of the pressures apparent at 
the beginning of this century from official initiatives, academic opinion 
and self-doubt among the managing class appear to have abated.  Many 
companies are changing their styles of governance and related 
management systems.  This process of gradual change appears to have 
restored the confidence of Japanese corporate management, leaving what 
is mostly the traditional system in place but, if anything, more resilient 
than it was before. The factor of increasingly tolerated external 
supervision noted above is not the only change at work. Some Japanese 
companies devote great attention to investor relations and have a higher 
degree of transparency than in the past. This tendency is not universal and 
one observer commented, ‘the good companies are getting better but the 
bad companies aren’t changing anything’, but there is certainly a marked 
change compared to 20 years ago at many major companies. 
Strengthening internal controls has also become a matter of concern at 
many companies and the new Company Law implemented in 2006 
requires clearer demarcation of inspection duties. The quality of internal 
controls is increasingly seen as a determinant of the quality of future 
corporate governance and this may well have a profound impact, over the 
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medium term, in the way companies are managed. Thus the general 
picture is of a system embedded in robust social practices that has 
emerged from a period of instability with its key elements intact, but 
which is undergoing gradual modification. The pre-existing system of 
Japanese corporate governance appears to be surviving well and has not 
been swept away by a ‘global standard’. Part of its strength lies in its 
ability to absorb new elements to amend the details, though not the core, 
of its structure. 
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